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Abstract 
Becker (1974) introduced to modern economics the idea that others care about what others 
think about them and derived many useful insights from this assumption.  But he did not 
provide a very complete description of the general equilibrium of an economy in which 
people both demand respect from and supply respect to others.  This paper analyzes the 
equilibrium price of respect, showing how it depends on the distribution of material 
endowments and discussing whether we would expect that, as society gets richer, the market 
for respect becomes more or less important.  It explains why a demand for respect is a human 
universal in terms of Becker’s observation that this helps to provide insurance where markets 
are absent.  Although the demand for respect is universal, the activities that command respect 
have enormous cultural diversity – the paper explains how there can be many Nash equilibria 
if respect is withheld from those who violate prescribed behaviour.  Finally the paper 
discusses where, in a modern economy, respect is demanded and supplied arguing it is 
primarily bundled up with other goods and services because of the nature of the costs of 
supplying it.  
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 1 
Introduction 
People care about what others think of them.  This observation was introduced to modern 
economics in Becker (1974, 1976) who used it to motivate his paper, ‘A Theory of Social 
Interactions’.  Becker also notes this is an old idea and gives the examples of both 
Bentham and Marshall who included such desires in their lists of basic human wants.    
The first part of Becker (1974) considers a model in which people get utility from 
material consumption and from ‘distinction’, the consumption of which can be increased 
by expenditure of material resources.  Becker then considers how the demand for 
distinction is likely to be affected by increases in income and the ‘price’ of distinction, 
and then applies this framework to a number of situations, one of which has spawned the 
very productive theory of the family (Becker, 1991). 
 But the model in Becker (1974) is almost entirely a partial equilibrium model in 
which the price of distinction is treated as exogenous.  This can be thought of as a 
complete analysis of the ‘market for distinction’ only under rather special situations in 
which the supply of distinction can be ignored1.  There are surprisingly few papers that 
aim to provide a general equilibrium treatment of the market for distinction.  One that 
does is Becker, Murphy and Werning (2005) who assume that individuals get utility from 
‘status’ (the position in the distribution of distinction) and analyze the equilibrium price 
of status when status is conferred by direct purchase of a status position or by 
consumption of some good that is in inelastic supply (e.g. diamonds).  And Benabou and 
Tirole (2006) consider a model in which information is imperfect and actions convey 
information about one’s generosity and individuals want to be thought of as generous. 
                                                 
1
 For example, in which distinction is purchased by transferring resources to other family members so the 
price is always the price of the consumption good. 
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 The approach taken in this paper is somewhat different – it argues that distinction 
is really something that is supplied by other people.  If the consumption of diamonds 
leads to distinction in our culture this is only because others choose to confer distinction 
on the wearers of the biggest diamonds.  A good example of this dependence of 
distinction on the attitudes of others is the wearing of fur coats.  In Britain this used to be 
(and in some countries still is) a mark of distinction and status because they are 
expensive.  But, in modern Britain very few people wear fur coats because the attitude 
(rightly or wrongly) of the general public is that to wear them is to condone unspeakable 
cruelty to animals.  The distinction conferred on the wearers of fur coats crucially 
depends on the attitudes of others.  
So distinction is really a flow of ‘good feeling’ from one person to another.  To 
capture this idea of a flow between people this paper refers to this as ‘respect’ rather than 
distinction.  The main reason for this is grammatical - one can say that A respects B 
(emphasizing a flow from A to B) but there is not an equivalent simple expression 
involving ‘distinction’.  In addition, distinction carries connotations of rank that may or 
may not be relevant but flows of respect may be two-way (mutual respect) or even, 
conceivably, provided to oneself (self-respect).   
 The first section sets up a model of an exchange economy (imagined to be a 
stylized model of a simple but rational society) in which respect enters the utility function 
and discusses the determinants of the equilibrium price of respect (in terms of the 
consumption good).  In doing so, it treats the market for respect as a well-functioning 
perfectly competitive market.  One might wonder if this is appropriate given that the 
market for respect is likely to deviate from the perfectly competitive ideal. 
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First, because there is not an explicit market in which respect can be bought and 
sold with a quoted price, the ‘law of one price’ is unlikely to hold in reality.  In addition, 
respect is a heterogeneous product with the respect of some people being more highly 
valued than the respect of others, thus making it even harder to see a single price.  From 
these facts, some have argued that it is wrong to think of respect as being bought and sold 
at all that, for example, if you try to buy respect you automatically do not get it.  I think 
that conclusion is a mistake – our reluctance to supply respect to someone who craves it 
too obviously is really the bargaining ploy of trying to increase the price to someone who 
seems desperate for the product.  The premise of this paper is that there is insight to be 
obtained by cutting through all the complications caused by the undoubted imperfections 
in the real world market for respect to think about the workings of this market in its 
idealized form. 
What insights are obtained by the analysis of the market for respect in this way?  
The paper shows how in equilibrium, those with high endowments must be net 
demanders of respect and those with low endowments net suppliers if, as seems plausible, 
respect is a normal good.  Hence the market for respect makes the distribution of 
consumption more equal than the distribution of income.  The equilibrium price of 
respect depends on the distribution of income, with a rise in mean income raising the 
equilibrium price.  We argue that there is no presumption that the market for respect 
becomes less important as people get richer so one cannot assume that respect is less 
important in our economy than in that of our ancestors.  In addition, if the marginal 
propensity to demand respect is increasing in income (and the paper presents some 
suggestive evidence that this is the case) then an increase in inequality will also increase 
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the equilibrium price of respect.  If this is true then the model predicts that the cut-off 
income level at which someone’s net demand for respect is zero must be above the mean 
level of income – this can explain why our society seems to have a relatively small 
number of people who command respect and a large number who are net suppliers.   
The paper also argues that recognising the demand for respect is a potential 
explanation for at least some aspects of apparently pro-social preferences.  The main 
model used in the paper is one in which the utility function contains only private goods – 
the consumption good and respect.  But if one only looks at the material sphere it appears 
that individuals derive utility from transfers to others (so appear altruistic) but the 
interpretation of this is that they are buying respect.  Similarly, utility is affected by the 
price of respect which is affected by the distribution of income so individuals seem to 
care about the distribution of income.   
 Although a desire for respect seems to be a feature of all known cultures so is a 
human universal in the sense of Brown (1991), it is not entirely clear why this should be 
the case as the market for respect consumes some material resources that would seem to 
be better-used in increasing evolutionary fitness.  The second section follows Becker 
(1974) and argues that the purpose is to provide insurance in a situation where explicit 
insurance markets are non-existent (as they surely were in the environment of 
evolutionary adaptation).  We also argue that the market for respect only plays this role if 
respect is a normal good and that the insurance properties are improved if the marginal 
propensity to consume respect out of income is increasing in income.  However, we also 
suggest reasons why the demand for respect will not be so strong as to eliminate all 
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inequalities in consumption, why we value the respect of kin more than non-kin, and why 
supplying respect to others is costly. 
 Although the desire for respect is a human universal, the activities that command 
respect show a lot of variation across cultures.  Sometimes respect seems to be associated 
with activities that appear to have no rational basis.  The model used in the paper up to 
this point is one of a ‘rational society’ in which the equilibrium is Pareto Efficient.  The 
third section relaxes this and considers Nash equilibria.  It is shown how inefficient 
activities can be sustained if respect is denied to those who do not supply respect to those 
who undertake the prescribed activities.  Many behaviours can be explained in this way 
as there are an infinite number of possible Nash equilibria so this is a potential 
explanation for the enormous cultural diversity that we see in human societies. 
 The fourth section then considers our own culture and considers how respect is 
demanded and supplied in a modern economy.  Because respect is largely exchanged in 
human interactions it is argued that it is most likely to be provided jointly with other 
goods so that an explicit market for purchase and sale of respect does not exist.  Because 
people have many interactions at work it is argued that the workplace is somewhere 
where we would expect to see many transactions in respect.  However, it is also argued 
that some transactions in the product market also involve transactions in respect.  This 
section also discusses the incentives for technical progress in the supply of respect and 
how this might be achieved.   
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1. A Simple Model 
Preferences 
This paper models ‘respect’ as a flow from one person to another.  Assume that all 
individuals have the same utility function that is given by ( ), ,d su c r r  where c is a 
consumption good, dr  is a measure of the respect received from others (so the demand 
by this individual for respect), and sr  is a measure of the respect given by this individual 
to others (so the supply of respect by the individual).  Assume utility is increasing in 
consumption and respect received, but decreasing in respect supplied.  One might wonder 
why it is costly to supplying respect to others – it might be inherently unpleasant to give 
respect to others (and, hence, admit one’s inferiority)2 or because it takes time/resources 
to give respect.  In the latter case, the c in the utility function should be interpreted as the 
consumption good used by the individual but not all of this will be ‘consumed’ – some 
will be used to supply respect to others.  Assume also that there is diminishing marginal 
utility to c, dr  and sr in the usual way.   
One other simplification made for the moment is to assume that respect from all 
individuals is perfectly substitutable so that if sjir is the flow of respect from individual j to 
i, the respect received by individual i is given by:  
 
d s
i ji
j i
r r
≠
=
 
(1)
 
and the total amount supplied by i is given by:   
 
s s
i ij
j i
r r
≠
=
 
(2)
 
                                                 
2
 The evolutionary argument presented in a later section could be used to explain why this might be the 
case as if it is costless to supply respect, the ‘price’ will be zero and the market for respect will not serve 
the social insurance function it is suggested is its purpose. 
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The assumption of perfect substitutability in respect supplied and received implicit in (1)
and (2) is made for simplicity rather than realism though later we show how a more 
realistic model can be reduced to the set-up here.  We also assume that individuals do not 
supply respect to themselves though nothing much is lost by that given the assumption of 
perfect substitutability. 
Transactions 
How will respect flow between individuals in this society?  We are going to 
assume that individuals are self-interested so that no-one is going to just give ‘respect’ for 
nothing in return3.  In the model presented here the things that agents value are respect 
and material goods so there  are two possible types of transaction – goods for respect, and 
respect for respect (mutual respect).   
We are going to start with an analysis of a rational society in which any Pareto 
improving transaction will occur.  In the ‘simple society’ in which there are no explicit 
markets, one should imagine that these transactions form a series of bilateral exchanges.  
In this case, an equilibrium allocation will be in the core, a set that might be quite large.  
But we will invoke the result (e.g. Debreu and Scarf, 1963) that as we replicate such an 
economy, the core shrinks to the perfectly competitive equilibrium and just discuss this 
instead.  This does not mean there has to be an explicit market for respect (as discussed in 
the introduction, there is not one), just that the equilibrium outcomes will be the same as 
if there was one. 
So we will think of equilibrium as being a price (in terms of the consumption 
good) of ‘respect’ and demands/supplies of respect that clear the market for respect. 
                                                 
3
 Though when one looks at human cultures one sees that the activities that induce some to supply respect 
to others often appear pointless and inefficient – why this might be the case is discussed in the third section. 
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Individual Demands/Supplies 
Suppose individual i has an endowment iy  of the consumption good – the basic feature 
of the model is that there is variation in the endowment across individuals.  Agent i will 
choose ( ), ,d si i ic r r to solve the following problem: 
 ( ) ( ), ,max , , . . , 0, 0d si i i d s d s d si i i i i i i i ic r r u c r r s t c pr pr y r r+ − ≤ ≥ ≥  (3) 
This will have a solution that can be written as the demand functions and supply 
functions, ( ) ( ), , ,d sr p y r p y . A net demand function can be written as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,d sr p y r p y r p y= −  (4) 
Because it is only net demands that matter, it is helpful to write the utility function in 
terms of the net demand for respect.  Hence, write: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ), max , , . . max 0,s s s s
r
u c r u c r r r s t r r= + ≥ −  (5) 
One way to think about (5) is that the individual is supplying respect to themselves in an 
optimal way given the level of consumption and the net trades in the market for respect – 
however one does not need to assume that self-respect is feasible given the assumption 
that respect can be bought and sold in the market at price p.  It is convenient to do 
everything in terms of the net demand so the utility function in (5) is what we will work 
with until the third section. 
Let us consider some likely features of the net demand for respect.  It is natural to 
assume that r is a normal good so the net demand for respect is in increasing in y.  This 
means that, for any given price there will be cut-off income level, *y , such that an 
individual with a higher income is a net demander of respect and an individual with a 
lower income a net supplied.  Note also that because those with zero income will be net 
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suppliers of respect i.e. ( ),0 0r p < , respect can be a luxury good in the sense of a greater 
fraction of income being spent on it even if ( ), /r p y y∂ ∂  does not depend on y.  However 
we might also expect that the marginal propensity to spend extra income on respect is 
increasing in y i.e. ( )2 2, / 0r p y y∂ ∂ >  - certain results will be shown to depend on 
whether this is true or not.  Because this is important, Table 1 presents some suggestive 
evidence on this point.  It is natural to think that giving money to charity is one way to 
buy respect in our culture (though not the only way).  Table 1 shows the fraction of 
expenditure spent on ‘religious and welfare activities’ (which includes all donations to 
charities) in the US by different income bands - the fact that the richer give a higher share 
of expenditure to charity is perhaps evidence that ( ), /r p y y∂ ∂  is increasing in y.  
Pharoah and Tanner (1997) also report estimates that charitable giving is a luxury good in 
the UK. 
If the agent is a net demander of respect then a rise in the price of respect has a 
substitution and income effect that go in the same direction, both acting to reduce the 
demand for respect.  If the individual is a net supplier then the income and substitution 
effects go in opposite directions.  However one can definitely say that the cut-off level 
*y  falls as p rises. 
Equilibrium 
The equilibrium price of respect will be one where net demands are equal to zero.  
If the distribution of income is f(y) we can write this as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ), 0R p r p y f y dy= =  (6) 
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Will this equilibrium price exist or be unique?  Conditions for existence are 
straightforward – if the price is zero, the net demand must be positive, when the price is 
‘infinite’, it must be negative.  By continuity there must be a price at which net demands 
are zero.  But because of the potentially ambiguous effect of a rise in the price of respect 
on the supply of respect by the lowest status individuals, there might be more than one 
equilibrium.  Figure 1 shows a possible situation.  There must be an odd number and 
simple-minded dynamics suggest that some will be stable and some unstable – in Figure 
1 A and C are stable, B unstable.  This raises the possibility that there are multiple 
equilibrium configurations of society which differ in the price of respect.  At any stable 
equilibrium it must be that case that the aggregate net demand function, ( )R p , is 
decreasing in p – this will be important in some comparative statics.  
There are some features of the equilibrium which, though obvious, are 
nevertheless worth noting.  Most importantly, there will be a positive correlation between 
income, consumption and respect so that the highest income individuals are also the ones 
with the highest status.  But, this is not just because they are consuming more but because 
they give more to those with lower-incomes.  There is a transfer of material resources 
from rich to poor so that the distribution of consumption will be more equal than the 
distribution of income.  In hunter-gatherer societies this is often the way in which status 
is conferred as the institution of food-sharing is very common.  Many anthropologists 
(e.g. Hawkes, 1993; Hill and Kaplan, 1994) argue that food is given up in return for 
prestige though there is some dispute about whether this prestige can be ‘cashed-in’ for 
material resources at a later date or is simply valued in itself (see Ridley, 1997, for an 
accessible introduction to these debates).  
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 It is also of some interest to know the fractions of the population that will be on 
the different sides of the market for respect.  We are used to thinking of societies as 
hierarchical in which the majority are net suppliers of respect to a minority.  It is simple 
to provide sufficient conditions for this to be the equilibrium outcome. 
 
Result 1:  If ( )2 2, / 0r p y y∂ ∂ ≥  then ( )*y E y≥  with equality only if the marginal 
propensity to demand respect out of income is constant except for a set of measure zero. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
If the distribution of income is skewed so that the mean is above the median this result 
says that more than half the population will be net suppliers of respect in equilibrium so 
that our society will be hierarchical with a few high status individuals.  The simplest way 
to understand this result is to consider the case where the marginal propensity to consume 
respect out of income is a constant so we can write the net demands as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ),r p y p y pα β= −   (7) 
In this case it is simple to show that the equilibrium price must satisfy: 
 ( ) ( )*p E yβ =  (8) 
So that an individual will be a net demander of respect if their income is above the mean.  
If the marginal propensity to consume respect out of income rises with income then this 
acts to further increase the demands of those with high-incomes leading to a higher 
equilibrium price and an even higher cut-off y*.   
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Some Comparative Statics 
The price of respect is obviously affected by the distribution of income.  So, lets consider 
how it is affected by changes in this distribution and how this affects the utility of 
different individuals in society.   
First, consider an increase in the average level of income modeled as a shift in the 
distribution in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.  Because of the assumed 
normality of the demand for respect this must increase the net demand at any given price.  
At any stable equilibrium net demands must be decreasing in the price so this rise in net 
demand must raise the equilibrium price of respect. 
 
Result 2: An increase in income levels must raise the equilibrium price of respect 
 
 Result 2 says that we would expect the price of respect to rise as material well-
being rises.  But this does not necessarily mean that the market for respect becomes more 
or less important as material well-being increases.  This is a question of some importance 
as we would like to know whether ‘respect’ is more or less important in our societies than 
in simpler and poorer ones.  A simple measure of ‘importance’ is the fraction of the total 
endowment of the consumption good that is used in transfers of respect between people. 
 To show this is ambiguous, a simple example will be used.  Assume that the net 
demand for respect is as in (7) and that income evolves over time so that the distribution 
of log income is only changed by the mean.  It will be convenient to work with the 
position in the income distribution, F, so that we will assume that the income associated 
with position F at time t is given by: 
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 ( ) ( ) 1
0
, ( ) ( ) 1y F t t y F where y F dFµ= =   (9) 
So that ( )tµ  is mean income at time t.  We know that the equilibrium price must satisfy 
(8) so that an individual will be a net demander of respect if their income exceeds mean 
income i.e. if ( ) 1y F ≥ .  This means that the cut-off between demanders and suppliers of 
respect will be a constant F* over time.  Now consider the total amount of consumption 
good given up by those who are net demanders of respect.  This must be given by: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
* *
1
*
, ,
1
F F
F
p t r p t y F t dF p t p t t y F p t dF
p t p t t y F dF
α µ β
α µ
 = − 
= −  
 



 (10) 
So, the total fraction of material income involved in the market for respect is simply (10) 
divided by the average endowment of the material good ( )tµ .  Whether this increases or 
decreases over time then simply depends on whether ( )p pα  is increasing or decreasing 
in p as we know that the price of respect will rise as average income rises.  If ( )p pα  is 
increasing in p then respect becomes more important over time while if it is decreasing 
then it becomes less important.  If it does not depend on p then respect maintains its 
importance over time.  One interpretation of the condition about how ( )p pα varies with 
p is whether the relevant question is whether demand for respect has a price elasticity 
bigger or smaller than one for those with very large incomes.  If it is smaller than one 
then we would expect the market for respect to become more important as people get 
richer. 
 Simple introspection is unlikely to deliver a definitive answer to the question of 
whether the market for respect will be more or less important in modern societies and this 
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will be left as an open question that can only be answered if one managed to quantify 
transactions that involve respect. 
It is not just the level but also the inequality of income that is likely to affect the 
price of respect.  We model an increase in inequality as a mean-preserving spread in y4.  
One can sign the effect of such a change on the equilibrium price if one can sign the 
change in net demand ( )R p .   
 
Result 3: A mean-preserving spread in the distribution of y will raise (reduce) the 
equilibrium price of respect if ( ),r p y  is a convex (concave) function of y. 
 
Proof: 
Invoking results in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970), a mean-preserving spread in the 
distribution of y will reduce net demands at a given price if ( ),r p y  is concave in y and 
increase net demands at a given price if ( ),r p y  is convex. 
 
Again, the result depends on whether ( ), /r p y y∂ ∂  is increasing or decreasing in y.  It 
seems plausible to think of ( ),r p y  as being a weakly convex function of y so that the 
equilibrium price of respect will be non-decreasing in inequality.  An increase in 
inequality will also lead to more transactions in respect so that the market for respect will 
become more important.  The other side of this is that if some institution like the welfare 
                                                 
4
 Note that one may want to do a mean-preserving spread in log y not y itself.  In this case the theorem that 
follows needs to have y replaced by log y. 
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state acts to reduce inequality in material resources then the price of respect and its 
importance in society will go down. 
 
The Demand for Respect and Pro-Social Preferences 
The model of this section is one in which individuals only care about what 
happens to them – their consumption of a physical good and the net demand for respect.  
However, if one just restricts attention to utility functions that depend on the consumption 
of material goods (of the self and others), the only way to explain the behaviour observed 
is if the material well-being of others enters the utility function, i.e. agents have social 
preferences.  Hence this model is a potential explanation of certain aspects of social 
preferences.  There are a number of ways to see this. 
First, it appears that individuals derive utility from transfers to others (so appear 
altruistic) but the interpretation of this is that they are buying respect.  One can see this 
from inspection of the direct utility function ( ),u c r in which r can be thought of as 
consumption given to others5.  This way of thinking about the utility function is then 
identical to Andreoni’s (1989) ‘warm-glow’ model in which individuals get utility 
directly by giving to others though the price of respect enters the utility function and is 
implicitly treated as a constant by Andreoni when doing comparative statics. 
 Secondly, utility is affected by the price of respect which is affected by the 
distribution of income This induces, through the indirect utility function, an apparent 
dependence of utility not just on own income but on average income, something that is 
                                                 
5
 Note that this particular specification only makes the utility function depend on the amount by which one 
increases the consumption of others not the level of their consumption (which is the more common 
assumption).  However if the amount of respect that is obtained from someone by a given transfer of goods 
depends on the level of their consumption, the distinction might not be as clear-cut as that.   
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often claimed to be evidence of ‘social preferences’.  Here this apparent dependence 
occurs because the price of respect is not included in any price index designed to measure 
average incomes6.  However, a rise in average incomes has different effects on the utility 
of different people.  For those who are net demanders of respect, the rise in the price 
makes them worse off, so, for a given own income a rise in the income of others makes 
them worse-off.  However for those who are suppliers the rise in the price of respect 
makes them better-off.  This implies that the marginal utility of own-income is decreasing 
in the average level of income, at least over some range. 
Hence, it is perhaps tempting to see the model presented here as an alternative to 
other theories of pro-social preferences of which the most popular current form is 
probably ‘reciprocal altruism’ (see Fehr and Gachter, 2000, for a brief survey)7.  That 
literature emphasizes that agents are prepared to sacrifice material rewards both to reward 
fair and punish behaviour that is seen as ‘unfair’.  But, the evidence from some 
experiments does suggest that apparently pro-social behaviour is not always motivated by 
a concern for fairness.  For example, Hoffman at al (1994) showed that in a dictator game 
when complete anonymity was assured a much higher proportion of subjects kept all the 
money for themselves.  This suggests that apparently fair behaviour in dictator games 
without complete anonymity is because of a concern about what others might think about 
them – indeed the authors offer an interpretation virtually identical to the model of this 
paper arguing that “[other-regarding] behaviour may be due not to a taste for ‘fariness’ 
                                                 
6
 This assumes that the price of respect is not bundled up in other goods who are included in a price index – 
this is discussed later 
7
 A strong version of this would be to argue that a model based on the demand for respect can replace all 
other models of social preferences.  But, to do so, one would have to explain why, in anonymous games, 
people still seem to choose ‘fair’ outcomes (though so less so than in non-anonymous games).  So one 
would have to be prepared to take the step of assuming that people get utility not just from what others 
think of them but from what they think they think of them.  This idea is discussed further in the fourth 
section but might be one step too far for many economists. 
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…, but rather to a social concern for what others may think, and for being held in high 
regard by others” (Hoffman et al, 1994, p371). 
Guth, Huck and Ockenfels (1996) also present the result of an experiment in 
which the endowment one subject may be high or low and they must choose to give 
money to others in a type of ultimatum game (though one with 3 players rather than the 
more common 2).  A low offer could be a fair split of a low endowment or an unfair split 
of a high endowment.  Large fractions of subjects who have the high endowment choose 
to give an amount that is a fair split of the low endowment, suggesting that the apparent 
generosity observed in ultimatum games is partly a result of concern about what others 
might think of them.  
A very strong claim would be that all apparent observations of pro-social 
behaviour can be interpreted as motivated by a demand for respect.  That is probably too 
strong – people are certainly observed to be generous in situations where the recipient of 
the generosity cannot directly deliver a flow of respect.  It might be that people can 
derive utility from what they think others think about them, a possibility discussed in the 
conclusion.  However, it may be that the two approaches to explaining pro-social 
behaviour are complements rather than substitutes.  For example, in the fascinating 
account of the outcomes of economic experiments in different societies (Henrich et al, 
2004), concerns not just about material pay-offs but what others think about one are often 
used to rationalize results.  For example among the Hadza (foragers from Tanzania), it is 
stated that “cooperation and sharing is enforced by a fear of punishment that comes in the 
form of informal social sanctions, gossip and ostracism” (Henrich et al, 2004, p40).  
Hence the literature on reciprocal altruism could benefit from paying attention to the 
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psychic part of utility.  Psychic punishment may be more effective than material 
punishment because it is cheaper to the person doing it so can be threatened more 
credibly. 
    
A More Realistic Model of the Technology for Demanding and Supplying Respect 
(1) and (2) assume that the utility an agent gets from respect is just the sum of the respect 
received from every individual.  Implicit in this specification is the assumption that the 
marginal benefit of extra respect from an individual is the same for everyone, irrespective 
of how much respect they are supplying to you.  But, while this specification is 
convenient, it may not be very realistic.  It seems plausible to imagine that there is 
diminishing marginal utility of respect from any single individual – agents prefer to 
receive a little respect from a lot of people rather than a lot from a few people.  A simple 
way of capturing this idea is to modify (1) and assume that:  
 ( )d si ij
j i
r rφ
≠
=  (11) 
where ( )φ  is a concave function.  If we just make this change and keep the technology 
of supplying respect the same then the equilibrium must have individuals who supply 
respect doing so in little packets to as many people as possible as this maximizes the total 
benefit.  However, it is plausible to think there is some non-convexity on the supply side 
as supplying respect to an individual requires personal contact so there is a fixed cost of 
meeting them but, once met, the marginal cost of giving extra respect to them is quite 
small.  So, let us assume that the disutility of supplying respect is given by:  
 ( ) ( ). 0s s sj ij ij
i j
r C I r c r
≠
 = > +   (12) 
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where ( )0sijI r >  is an indicator function for whether j supplies any respect at all to i.  We 
can prove the following.   
 
Result 4:  
a. Any non-zero flow of respect between individuals in equilibrium is of a size r* 
that maximizes: 
 
( )
( )
r
C c r
φ
+
 (13) 
b. the model can be reduced to the simple model in which ( ),d sr r  is interpreted as 
the number of people from whom one demands and supplies respect and p is the price to 
be paid for a flow of respect of size r*. 
Proof: See Appendix. 
 
 This result shows that for each set of individuals for whom there is a flow of 
respect between them, there is a constant amount of respect r*, and the choice for 
individuals is how many people to supply respect at this level to.  One should then 
reinterpret the r in the model of the previous section as being the number of people one 
demands or supplies respect from and the price as the price of a packet of respect of size 
r*. 
 
Status 
Becker, Murphy and Werning (2005) use a model of status which can be interpreted as a 
model in which it is one’s position in the distribution of respect that is important not just 
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one’s own consumption as has been assumed so far.  They show how the equilibrium can 
be implemented by a market in a status good (e.g. diamonds).  But the status good could 
be respect itself in which case their model could be applied to the present idea.  Their 
model can hence be thought of as differing from the model of this paper simply in the 
specification of preferences – the model here assumes only one’s own net demand for 
respect enters one’s utility function whereas Becker, Murphy and Werning (2005) assume 
the net demand of others enters negatively (as this reduces one’s position in the status 
distribution).  We are not going to discuss which model of preferences is better here but 
for many purposes it may not matter.   
 
2. The Origin of the Demand for Respect 
The desire for respect from others seems to a be a feature of all known human cultures so 
is a human universal in the sense of Brown (1991)8.  This means that one should think 
that this demand is an adaptation that is either hard-wired into our genes or our culture 
(i.e. it is a necessary condition for a culture to be able to survive and reproduce9).  But, 
why should this be the case?  The problem is that the resources consumed by the market 
for respect would seem to be better used in directly increasing evolutionary fitness.  
Becker (1974, p1076) suggested that the main purpose is to provide insurance.  In a 
society where individual endowments are very uncertain (e.g. because the outcome of a 
hunt is very uncertain) and there are no or limited markets (a situation that describes the 
                                                 
8
 A number of the listed human universals seem related to the ideas here : food-sharing, admiration of 
generosity, gift-giving, fairness. 
9
 Cooking is something that is generally thought of as not being an instinct but is a feature of almost all 
cultures because of its great utility. 
 21 
early evolutionary environment for humans) there is a big advantage to a mechanism that 
enables social insurance10.   
To make this argument slightly more formal imagine that the model analysed 
above is the equilibrium in a single period and that this is repeated over multiple periods.  
Imagine, for the moment that, all individuals have the same ability so the distribution of y 
in one period is independent from that in any other11. Imagine that evolutionary fitness is 
a function only of the consumption of material goods and is given by a concave function 
( )cυ .  If this is the utility function of individuals (so there is no demand for respect) 
then, in the one-shot game, there can be no exchange and no mutual insurance and 
expected fitness is given by ( )E yυ  .  However we know from our earlier analysis that, 
with a demand for respect in the utility function consumption will be a transformation of 
y and, hence, expected fitness will be higher when, ex post, individuals do not seek to 
maximize their fitness.  This will also be true if the market for respect uses material 
resources as long as the cost is not too high.  Of course, this result comes from ‘missing 
markets’ but, even if markets are now relatively complete they were not for most of our 
history. 
We can take this argument one step further and suggest a reason why the marginal 
propensity to demand respect might be increasing in income as this will increase the 
insurance properties of the one-shot game. However it is likely that the demand for 
respect is never so strong that complete insurance is provided as this would not then give 
                                                 
10
 See Posner (1980) for an argument that many of the institutions of non-literate societies are adaptations 
to a demand for insurance that cannot be supplied through formal markets. 
11
 Of course, there are differences in capabilities so that the endowments of some individuals will be 
systematically higher than those of others.  Such individuals will tend to emerge as the higher-status 
individuals in society. 
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any advantage in fitness to those who are the most productive, and to select differentially 
on those is likely to have been an advantage in many early societies.    
 There is one big problem with the argument in this section.  There are clear 
advantages for a group to have a market for respect to facilitate mutual insurance.  But, 
within a group, there are advantages for individuals who are happy to supply respect to 
others when needs arise, but who do not themselves crave the respect of others.   
 Consider a situation in which others both supply and demand respect and consider 
the incentives of an individual.  There are clear incentives to supply respect to others who 
demand it because this is likely to be a cost-effective way to obtain material resources.  
The problem is to explain why individuals should value the respect of others as doing so, 
means giving material resources to others in some situations.  However there are obvious 
benefits to providing material support to kin and also to non-kin who can be expected to 
provide material support in the future to kin (including oneself).  And this can be 
expected if one is providing support to those who have a demand for respect from one’s 
kin.  Hence, in our early evolutionary history when it is very likely that we lived in 
groups in which a large fraction of the group were related in some way or could be 
expected to provide help to relatives in the future, it is possible that this is a plausible 
explanation.  This is essentially a variant of the vigorous debate about whether and how 
pro-social behaviour can emerge in evolutionary equilibrium – see Bergstrom (2002) for 
an accessible introduction to this for economists. 
 This approach can also explain a number of other features of the desire for 
respect.  First, we value the respect of those who are closer to us more than those who are 
distant with closeness often being related to kinship.  Secondly it can explain why the 
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demand for respect is not so strong that there is complete equality in outcomes – in this 
situation there would definitely be a benefit to an individual who valued respect less as 
the marginal utility must be higher.   Thirdly it can explain why it may be intrinsically 
unpleasant to supply respect to others as this ensures a positive equilibrium price of 
respect this enabling the market for respect to provide its role as social insurance.  
Fourthly, a modified model can explain gradations of respect – someone who thanks us 
for something can do so grudgingly or profusely.  As the cost of giving grudging or 
effusive thanks must be very similar, one might wonder why we see these gradations.  A 
simple explanation is that they help to provide incentives so that if we give respect too 
cheaply, the power of respect to motivate is weakened.  A good analogy is with the 
principle of marginal deterrence in punishment that suggests that the punishment should 
be proportional to the crime to ensure that criminals do not always have an incentive to 
commit ever-more serious offences to avoid capture.  
 Although the account given above offers a tentative explanation for why we value 
respect, there are perhaps other mechanisms that could produce the same effect.  When 
one thinks of the model presented above as being a repeated game in which one’s 
endowment is sometimes above and sometimes below the average, then the problem of 
providing insurance is one of sustaining a cooperative equilibrium in a repeated game.  
We know from folk theorems that equilibria that differ from autarky can be sustained but 
that one cannot generally get to the fully efficient outcome unless discount rates are 
sufficiently low.  But, if there is some way of increasing utility from the cooperative act 
in the one-shot game, then this can make more efficient equilibria sustainable – making 
people value the respect of others may be one such device.  In modern societies most 
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exchanges are between goods and money and the presence of money helps to solve the 
inter-temporal problem of people wanting goods at different points in time or different 
goods at the same point in time.  Samuelson (1958) and others suggest that money serves 
this function (among others). Hence one can see respect as a form of ‘proto-money’, 
something that is universally accepted in exchange for material goods in societies with no 
explicit markets12. 
    
3. Explaining Cultural Diversity 
This paper has emphasized that the all peoples have a desire for respect – they crave the 
good opinions of others.  But there is enormous diversity across cultures in the type of 
activities that attract respect.  The model we have presented here is of a ‘rational society’ 
in which respect is given in exchange for material goods and the equilibrium is Pareto 
Efficient both in terms of the utility function that people use in their behaviour and the 
fitness function.  But one suspects that some practices that we observe are not efficient in 
this sense. 
 A good example are the potlatch ceremonies once characteristic of the Native 
American tribes of the Pacific North-West.  Originally these were feasts provided by 
some individuals and with associated gift exchange.  These institutions can be thought of 
as the exchange of material goods for respect as they were connected with status 
hierarchies.  However, in at least one tribe, the Kwakiutl, the custom emerged of these 
                                                 
12
 It may also have other features of money – some of the literature on food-sharing among hunter-gatherers 
suggests that prestige can be used to purchase goods in the future.  In this case respect is also a store of 
value. 
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potlatches becoming orgies of destruction in which gifts were burnt or thrown into the 
sea13.  It is much harder to see the efficiency of such a destruction of material goods. 
 Obviously such institutions cannot emerge if one thinks that all exchanges of 
material goods and respect are in the core of the economy as any such allocation must be 
Pareto efficient.  But lets weaken the equilibrium concept to be a Nash Equilibrium.  We 
are interested in whether an inefficient Nash equilibrium can be sustained.  To keep 
things simple assume that all individuals have the same endowment of income, y, as the 
transfers between people are not important for the point that will be made. 
 The simplest possible form of an inefficient equilibrium is one in which 
individuals simply destroy some amount of material good, d.  If the utility function of 
individuals only contains material goods then this cannot be a Nash equilibrium – 
everyone would think they would be personally better-off if they did not do this.  But 
now consider the situation where individuals also value the respect of others and lets try 
to sustain the destruction as a Nash equilibrium. 
 The first idea is to think that individuals who destroy the goods receive respect 
from others so that the institutions of society are: 
a. destroy goods, d 
b. supply respect, r, to those who do this. 
In this case utility in the proposed equilibrium will be ( ), ,u y d r r−  as each individual 
destroys the goods, receives respect r from others and supplies it to others who do the 
same.  However, this cannot be a Nash equilibrium – to see this suppose an individual 
destroys their own goods, receives respect for it but does not supply respect to those who 
                                                 
13
 Potlatches ended up being banned in both the US and Canada in the late nineteenth century though these 
bans were later lifted. 
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do the same.  The utility in this case will be ( ), ,0u y d r−  which is higher than the 
equilibrium pay-off.  And if everyone defects in this way, no-one will get any respect for 
destroying goods and no-one will do it, taking us back to an efficient outcome.  The 
problem is that there is no incentive for individuals to supply goods to others who destroy 
them as they get nothing back in return. 
 But we can sustain the inefficient equilibrium if we add a third rule of behaviour 
to (a) and (b) above, namely: 
c. do not supply respect to anyone who breaches a. and b. 
Now consider the pay-off from deviation.  If an individual does not supply respect to 
those who destroy goods they will receive no respect themselves, in which case there is 
no point in destroying any goods themselves.  The pay-off from defection is then 
( ),0,0u y .  Hence the rules of behaviour (a)-(c) are a Nash equilibrium if: 
 ( ) ( ), , ,0,0u y d r r u y− >   (14) 
For a given value of r, we can always find a small enough value of d such that (14) is 
satisfied if mutual respect is demanded.  The second-order punishment of those who do 
not abide by the rules requires that those who fail to supply respect to those who destroy 
goods can be observed – it is then perhaps no surprise that these inefficient arrangements 
tend to be public ceremonies. 
 Of course, there is no escaping the fact that the Nash equilibrium is inefficient and 
is sustained by second-order punishment of those who do not abide by the rules.  All that 
is needed to move to an efficient equilibrium is for someone to propose an alternative 
arrangement (here, a reduction in d) and then everyone can agree that would be better for 
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all.  But the first person who points out that the emperor has no clothes in this way, risks 
a potentially ruinous loss in respect unless everyone else expects reason to dominate.     
We have offered an explanation for why a particular inefficient custom might 
persist but it should be obvious that we can use the demand for respect to sustain an 
infinite number of Nash equilibria.  This is the explanation for the enormous cultural 
diversity we see around us.  The argument that second-order rewards/punishments has the 
potential to sustain a very wide range of behaviours (both good and bad) is also contained 
in Boyd and Richerson (1992).   Of course one can explain anything in this way but that 
is the point – the enormous cultural diversity we observe suggests a large number of 
equilibria.  However, we would expect cultures with inefficient institutions not to prosper 
as much as others14.   
Let us now turn to the consideration of our own culture and the role played by 
respect in a modern economy.  One question raised by the above discussion is whether 
our culture is better thought of as the ‘rational society’ or one in which inefficient 
equilibria are sustained by fear of social ostracism.  It seems plausible to think that our 
society has become more anonymous and tolerant of those who choose to be different so 
let us imagine (perhaps complacently) that it is closer to the rational society15.  But where 
are the transactions in respect to be found? 
 
 
                                                 
14
 Though one needs to recognize that the way in which one culture may prosper at the expense of another 
may involve violence so one should not assume that cultures that have successfully propagated themselves 
through history are ‘better’ than ones that have not. 
15
 Though another consequence of greater anonymity is that information about individuals gets worse and 
the giving of respect may come to be based on signals that are correlated with actions that demand respect 
rather than the actions themselves – see Benabou and Tirole (2006) for one model along these lines. 
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4. Respect in a Modern Economy  
In the model of a ‘simple society’ used in this paper, respect is exchanged directly for 
material goods.  But, in modern economies almost all exchanges are for money in the 
first instance.  The markets for physical goods are very obvious, but one might wonder 
where is the market for respect?  There is certainly not a supermarket in which we 
directly purchase the approval of someone (though I am told that one can purchase such 
approval fairly directly by calling certain telephone numbers).  From this absence of 
explicit markets for respect one might conclude that respect is not very important in the 
modern economy so can safely be ignored in economic analysis.  One could argue (as has 
been done above) that donating money to charity is one way to buy respect but this 
represents such a small share of total expenditure that one would have to conclude that 
markets for respect were relatively unimportant if this was the only way to buy respect.  
But there are a number of reasons why such a conclusion might be too hasty. 
 First much respect is supplied and received, as it ever was, within the family and 
between friends where transfers of material resources are not mediated through markets.   
 Secondly, respect may be efficiently supplied and received bundled up with other 
goods and services.  Respect is easiest to exchange in interactions between people but, in 
line with a model presented earlier the cost of an interaction is probably mostly a fixed 
cost and the marginal cost, once interacting, is small.  But, once people are interacting 
one might as well use that interaction for some other productive purpose.  Hence, we 
might expect to see transactions in respect wherever people are interacting. 
 The workplace is somewhere where people spend a lot of time and interact a lot 
with others.  Hence we might expect a lot of exchange of respect within the workplace.  It 
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is then no surprise to find discussions of gift relationships within the workplace (Akerlof 
1982) – people are not just concerned with material things but with transactions in 
respect.  Because we think that respect flows from low-income to high-income people in 
exchange for material resources we would then expect the wage to be above the marginal 
product for low-income people in firms and below the marginal product for high-income 
people.  
 But people interact with each other in product as well as labour markets so we 
might expect to see transactions in respect bundled up in the purchase of goods and 
services.  When one stays in luxury hotel and part of the package is a set of very 
obsequious staff one is perhaps also purchasing their respect.  So, ‘customer service’ may 
be the supply of respect between people – this can explain why the price differential of 
luxury goods often seem to be far in excess of the differential in the quality of service. 
As in any sector, there are potential profits to be made by finding new ways of 
supplying the demand for respect.  But the model presented so far is one in which respect 
can only be supplied and received by direct human-to-human contact.  But, and here we 
enter the realms of wilder speculation, perhaps that is not necessary. 
 The demand for respect has at its heart the desire for others to think well of 
oneself.  But we never know exactly what others think (though their words and actions 
may give us a good idea) so maybe what we derive satisfaction from is when we think 
others think well of us.  In this case the demand for respect can be satisfied if we think 
that others have respect for us without necessarily them having to supply it directly. 
 The obvious problem with this is that, if this was the case, then we would seem to 
be able to increase our utility by thinking that others have a high impression of us even if 
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they do not.  Ultimately it is ourselves who satisfy our own demand for respect.  
However, there are reasons why things are not so simple as total control over our 
thoughts would not increase evolutionary fitness.   
 Many may think this change a step too far.  But before dismissing this idea out of 
hand, realize that it would buy us many things.  We can explain why, in dictator games, 
people often choose to give money to others (they think this will make others, perhaps the 
person running the experiment, think well of us), why people tip in restaurants to which 
they never expect to return, perhaps even some aspects of religion (our actions are 
motivated by the desire for the approval of something that might not even exist).  But 
what this means is that respect can be supplied at a distance.  If there is any truth in this 
market for respects may be more pervasive than we think.   
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has taken up Becker’s (1974) observation that people care about what others 
think of them and analysed a general equilibrium economy if which people both demand 
and supply respect.  In this view respect is ‘bought’ from others by the transfer of 
material goods to them.  Some might find this a very cynical view that seems to say that 
generosity is really a selfish act as it is only undertaken when it benefits the giver.  But, 
when we label someone who gives material goods to others as generous, that label is the 
flow of respect to that person and to fail to give the giver that label would be to 
jeopardize the transfer in the first place.  Being aware that generosity is motivated by a 
demand for respect only makes us more likely to praise those who are generous only not 
so much as to make our respect be sold too cheaply. 
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Using this framework, the paper has shown how those with high levels of material 
resources will end up commanding more respect than others and that the distribution of 
consumption will be more equal than the distribution of income.  It has argued that it is 
likely that society will be hierarchical with more people net suppliers than net demanders 
of respect.  It has shown how a rising level of income increases the equilibrium price of 
respect and that ‘respect’ may become a less or more important part of society.  It has 
argued that the demand for respect emerges from the beneficial effect of social insurance 
when insurance markets are absent.  It has explained the enormous cultural diversity in 
the activities that command respect as a range of Nash equilibria sustained by second-
order punishment or social ostracism for those who break the prescribed social norms.  
Finally, it has argued that transactions in respect can be typically be found in a modern 
economy bundled up with other transactions in product and labour markets because 
human interaction is necessary for them. 
 There are important research questions left unanswered by this paper.  We need to 
think about better ways of deciding whether the marginal propensity to consume respect 
rises with income as a number of interesting comparative statics depend on this.  We need 
to think about the activities in our own culture that command respect and whether this has 
changed significantly over time.  We need to think about whether respect can be supplied 
at a distance or whether fairly direct human interaction continues to be as necessary today 
as it was in the past.  And we need to think about how the undoubted imperfections in the 
market for respect alter the conclusions reached on the assumption of a perfectly 
competitive market. 
 
 32 
 
Appendix 
Proof of Result 1: 
The equilibrium condition (6) can be written as: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )*
*
, , 0
y
y
r p y f y dy r p y f y dy+ =   (15) 
where *y  is the cut-off income level at which net demands are zero so ( ), * 0r p y = .  
Integrating the two terms in (15) by parts we have that:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )*
*
, ,
1 0
y
y
r p y r p y
F y dy F y dy
y y
∂ ∂
− − =  ∂ ∂ 
 (16) 
Now if ( ),r p y
y
∂
∂
 is non-decreasing in y we have that:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* *
, , *
1 1
y y
r p y r p y
F y dy F y dy
y y
∂ ∂
− ≥ −      ∂ ∂ 
 (17) 
and that:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* *, , *y yr p y r p yF y dy F y dy
y y
∂ ∂
≤
∂ ∂ 
 (18) 
Combining (17), (18) and (16) we have that:  
 ( ) ( )*
*
1
y
y
F y dy F y dy− ≤     (19) 
which can be written as:  
 ( ) ( ) *1 *yE y F y dy dy y= − ≤ =     (20) 
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which proves the result.  One can readily see that if ( ),r p y
y
∂
∂
 is strictly increasing in y 
for any set of y not of measure zero then at least one of the inequalities in (17) or (18) 
must be strict and this makes the inequality in (20) strict. 
 
Proof of Result 4: 
One can imagine the competitive equilibrium as having a price p(r) associated with 
buying respect at level r from an individual.  A necessary condition for utility 
maximization is that, given the total utility from respect is to be dr , this is obtained in the 
lowest cost way i.e. agents must solve the problem: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ),min . . dN r Np r s t N r rφ =  (21) 
where N is the number of people from whom respect is purchased and r is the purchase 
from each individual (I have assumed equal amounts are purchased from all but this 
follows straightforwardly).  The minimization problem can be written as:  
 
( )
( )min
d
r
p r
r
rφ  (22) 
so that the purchases of respect will all be at the level of r that minimizes (22) – this 
might not be unique. 
On the supply side of the market a necessary condition for utility maximization is 
that, given the total respect supplied is to be dr , this is ‘sold’ in a revenue maximizing 
way i.e. agents must solve the problem: 
 ( ) ( ) [ ],max . . ( ) sN r Np r s t N C c r r+ =  (23) 
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where N is the number of people to whom respect is sold and r is the sale to each 
individual (I have assumed equal amounts are sold to all but this follows 
straightforwardly).  The maximization problem can be written as:  
 
( )
( )max
s
r
p r
r
C c r+
 (24) 
so that the purchases of respect will all be at the level of r that maximizes (22) – again 
this might not be unique.  The r chosen by the two sides of the market must, in 
equilibrium, be equal so, putting together the two sides of the market we have that r must 
be chosen to maximize:  
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( ).
p r r r
C c r p r C c r
φ φ
=
+ +
 (25) 
Given the assumptions made, the solution to this is unique – let us denote it by r*.  This 
could be derived more directly by thinking about the unit cost of providing dr   which 
must be minimized at the solution to (25). 
  
If the price of getting r* supplied from an individual is p then the utility function can be 
written as: 
 ( ) ( )( ), * , *d s d su y pN pN N r N C c rφ− + +    (26) 
which is the same generic form as in the simple model but with N interpreted as the 
amount of respect and p as the price of an optimal packet of respect. 
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Table 1 
The Share of expenditure on charity by expenditure band 
 
Total Family 
Expenditure 
($000) 
% of Total 
Expenditure on 
Religious and 
Welfare Activities 
Number of Families 
   
<$10 1.42 8049 
<$20 1.56 8396 
<$30 1.93 6673 
<$40 2.33 4402 
<$50 2.51 2990 
<$60 2.47 1813 
<$70 2.69 1146 
<$80 2.66 664 
<$90 2.18 419 
<$100 2.64 245 
>=$100 5.54 509 
Total 1.95 35306 
Notes: Data is from US Consumer Expenditure, 2000-2003 inclusive using the NBER 
extracts.  Attrition adjusted weights are used. 
Figure 1 
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